I received an interesting comment from a reader (Jason Weber) that shed some more light on this book:
"I definitely suggest reading Sweet Dreams
: it is very well written."
: it is very well written." -I will order it…and read it in two or three years probably
"I took a look at your blog and enjoyed reading Part V of your book review."
-Glad to hear that.
"I have a question and a few comments if you do not mind. First off, what page did you find the quote for Dennett's alternative explanation for delay in consciousness?"
- p.164, 3rd§, line 2 : « Orwellian alternative »
"I ask because this sounds more like an "Orwellian revision" than Dennett's model for consciousness.
As I understand it, he does not support either an Orwellian or Stalinesque explanation, "...and the question Orwellian or Stalinesque? (post experiential or pre-experiential) need have no answer" (Dennett, Time and the Observer, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm )."
-You are right that Dennett does not support either Orwellian or Stallinesque alternatives. I think I was wrong when I said that it is “his alternative explanation”. Actually he simply remarks that there is an Orwellian alternative to the Stallinesque model. Which I suppose makes his point that both explanations are possible, which is pointing to his multiple draft model.
"Thank you for bringing your blog to my attention, because I had forgotten how vehemently Dennett disagreed with Libet on the interpretation of those experiments."
-Strangely enough, I myself already read twice this part of the book and also forgot about it. Then I heard again about Libet type experiments and got quite excited about them, without realizing that I read a critique of them in Dennett. This really justifies my present effort to document what I understand from this book.
"Those experiments are very interesting to me and I had taken them at face value for a while."
-They are very interesting to me too. I am sympathetic to the idea that actions are decided before to be consciously felt as being decided…although I feel my confidence shaking a bit while reading this book.
"Your blog helped me to focus on some mistakes I had made. I do think that the unconscious parts of the brain plays a role in determining consciousness…"
-me too. I agree with Dennett that consciousness is probably distributed in the brain and that each location that get conscious, was not necessarily so the instant before. No single area for consciousness experience (I would have said otherwise six months ago. I might still change my mind ).
"…but that Libet's results and interpretations need a closer examination. Dennett provides that, so let me try to clear up exactly what Dennett does not like about Libet's experiments....
Daniel Dennett's criticisms of Benjamin Libet's famous experiment on intentionality:
In principle, I do not believe that Dennett disagrees with the notion that unconscious parts of the brain cause consciousness."-you are right
"He disagrees that attaining an absolute timing of conscious events from verbal reports is possible because consciousness does not happen in a centralized location in the brain.
That is the disagreement. Dennett notes that the representations of visual events occur, "...in various different parts of the brain, starting at the retina and moving up through the visual system...brightness...is represented in some places and times...location in others...and motion in still others" (Consciousness Explained, p.165).
Consciousness comes from many parts of the brain. For instance, he does not seem to believe that a single neuron or a single system in the brain possesses the state of consciousness all the time."
-It seems to me that it is indeed his position but I have a hard time understanding why the lack of a central location for consciousness prevents absolute timing of conscious events. Even if a conscious event appears distributed in space or at a location only temporarily made conscious, timing seems still possible.
"It follows that unconscious parts of the brain cause consciousness or change to the state of consciousness."
-indeed
"Dennett disagree with Libet because of his interpretation that the unconscious parts send there messages to a central conscious part of the brain."
-ok, I would need to re-read this part to check that it is indeed what Libet thinks and not Dennett’s interpretation of what Libet thinks. I think that even by abandoning the Cartesian theater, it is still coherent to interpret the results of the experiment by saying that the conscious “feeling” that a decision is made is felt after the decision. E.g. the decision is made due to a certain number of neurons being turned on at various locations…and 350 ms later we feel it because these locations changed “state” or maybe (my hypothesis) because this event “get burned” thereby creating a memory (at these same locations, e.g. by strengthening connections).
"Dennett states that, "...cognition and control -- and hence consciousness -- is distributed around in the brain, no moment can count as the precise moment at which each conscious event happens" (Consciousness Explained, p. 169). If measuring the absolute timing of a conscious event is possible, then we must assume that consciousness happens in one place and at one time in the brain."
-Not one place, only one time. No? Even if spatially distributed, it could be simultaneous or within a time relatively short compared to the delay observed by Libet.
"Dennett's model differs, not because unconscious agents cause consciousness but, because consciousness is not thrown together in one spot in the brain (e.g. the pineal gland). For Dennett, different systems contain different parts of the stories that make up consciousness but there is no place where representations come together to form a central conscious story of events."
-That is well understood.
"The most telling quote from Dennett in the chapter of Consciousness Explained that discusses Libet's experiment is this,
-I like this idea. It makes sense to me. I think consciousness intensity and memorization intensity are linked. Being conscious could be what it “feels” to memorize.
"The state change Dennett mentions is key: it is not that he believes that every part of the brain that has the capacity for consciousness is always conscious. I take it that he means that those parts change state from unconscious to conscious but do not do so until they receive enough clout to contribute to the distributed conscious experience. As different parts of the brain become conscious, the story changes; I think that is what Dennett means by multiple drafts."
-I think you are right and I think I now understand better this chapter. Thanks! I will re-read it nevertheless to be sure my new understanding fits with what he writes.
"Chapter six is difficult to understand so I hope I am properly representing Dennett's theory above. Feel free to correct me or to ask questions. Thank you,"
"Thank you for bringing your blog to my attention, because I had forgotten how vehemently Dennett disagreed with Libet on the interpretation of those experiments."
-Strangely enough, I myself already read twice this part of the book and also forgot about it. Then I heard again about Libet type experiments and got quite excited about them, without realizing that I read a critique of them in Dennett. This really justifies my present effort to document what I understand from this book.
"Those experiments are very interesting to me and I had taken them at face value for a while."
-They are very interesting to me too. I am sympathetic to the idea that actions are decided before to be consciously felt as being decided…although I feel my confidence shaking a bit while reading this book.
"Your blog helped me to focus on some mistakes I had made. I do think that the unconscious parts of the brain plays a role in determining consciousness…"
-me too. I agree with Dennett that consciousness is probably distributed in the brain and that each location that get conscious, was not necessarily so the instant before. No single area for consciousness experience (I would have said otherwise six months ago. I might still change my mind ).
"…but that Libet's results and interpretations need a closer examination. Dennett provides that, so let me try to clear up exactly what Dennett does not like about Libet's experiments....
Daniel Dennett's criticisms of Benjamin Libet's famous experiment on intentionality:
In principle, I do not believe that Dennett disagrees with the notion that unconscious parts of the brain cause consciousness."-you are right
"He disagrees that attaining an absolute timing of conscious events from verbal reports is possible because consciousness does not happen in a centralized location in the brain.
That is the disagreement. Dennett notes that the representations of visual events occur, "...in various different parts of the brain, starting at the retina and moving up through the visual system...brightness...is represented in some places and times...location in others...and motion in still others" (Consciousness Explained, p.165).
Consciousness comes from many parts of the brain. For instance, he does not seem to believe that a single neuron or a single system in the brain possesses the state of consciousness all the time."
-It seems to me that it is indeed his position but I have a hard time understanding why the lack of a central location for consciousness prevents absolute timing of conscious events. Even if a conscious event appears distributed in space or at a location only temporarily made conscious, timing seems still possible.
"It follows that unconscious parts of the brain cause consciousness or change to the state of consciousness."
-indeed
"Dennett disagree with Libet because of his interpretation that the unconscious parts send there messages to a central conscious part of the brain."
-ok, I would need to re-read this part to check that it is indeed what Libet thinks and not Dennett’s interpretation of what Libet thinks. I think that even by abandoning the Cartesian theater, it is still coherent to interpret the results of the experiment by saying that the conscious “feeling” that a decision is made is felt after the decision. E.g. the decision is made due to a certain number of neurons being turned on at various locations…and 350 ms later we feel it because these locations changed “state” or maybe (my hypothesis) because this event “get burned” thereby creating a memory (at these same locations, e.g. by strengthening connections).
"Dennett states that, "...cognition and control -- and hence consciousness -- is distributed around in the brain, no moment can count as the precise moment at which each conscious event happens" (Consciousness Explained, p. 169). If measuring the absolute timing of a conscious event is possible, then we must assume that consciousness happens in one place and at one time in the brain."
-Not one place, only one time. No? Even if spatially distributed, it could be simultaneous or within a time relatively short compared to the delay observed by Libet.
"Dennett's model differs, not because unconscious agents cause consciousness but, because consciousness is not thrown together in one spot in the brain (e.g. the pineal gland). For Dennett, different systems contain different parts of the stories that make up consciousness but there is no place where representations come together to form a central conscious story of events."
-That is well understood.
"The most telling quote from Dennett in the chapter of Consciousness Explained that discusses Libet's experiment is this,
"Couldn't consciousness be a matter not of arrival at a point but rather a matter of representation exceeding some threshold of activation over the whole cortex or large parts thereof? On this model, an element of content becomes conscious at some time t, not by entering some functionally defined and anatomically located system, but by changing state right where it is: by acquiring some property or by having the intensity of one of its properties boosted above some threshold"(p. 166)."
-I like this idea. It makes sense to me. I think consciousness intensity and memorization intensity are linked. Being conscious could be what it “feels” to memorize.
"The state change Dennett mentions is key: it is not that he believes that every part of the brain that has the capacity for consciousness is always conscious. I take it that he means that those parts change state from unconscious to conscious but do not do so until they receive enough clout to contribute to the distributed conscious experience. As different parts of the brain become conscious, the story changes; I think that is what Dennett means by multiple drafts."
-I think you are right and I think I now understand better this chapter. Thanks! I will re-read it nevertheless to be sure my new understanding fits with what he writes.
"Chapter six is difficult to understand so I hope I am properly representing Dennett's theory above. Feel free to correct me or to ask questions. Thank you,"
ase.tufts.edu
Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatment of subjective timing. The standard Cartesian Theater model postulates a place in the brain where "it all comes together": where the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and "presented" for sub
ShareHere is part of a message of reply from Jason:
"...This might help to illuminate why Dennett is suspect of absolute timing of subjective experience:
In the last paragraph, I say that the "....state change Dennett mentions is key..." That is not exactly true. In fact, he warns that this view could lead us back to the Cartesian Theater, "...if it is claimed that the real...timing of such mode shifts is definitive of subjective sequence" (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 166). His key point in chapter six of the book is that the, "...temporal sequence in consciousness is...purely a matter of the content represented, not the timing of the representing (Dennett & Kinsbourne, Time and the Observer, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm ). Let's imagine an analogy to explore this point: mom is coming to visit you. Let's say that she decides Friday that she is coming to visit you on Monday. She sends you an email detailing her decision. Unfortunately, you do not check your email all weekend. Then, when Monday comes, you are utterly surprised to see your mom's smiling face when you open your front door. You then check your email and discover the news or your mother's decision to visit that day. The timing was such that you did not find out the news that your mother was visiting on Monday until she showed up on your doorstep. However, the decision was made and the message was sent earlier (i.e. Friday). This is why Dennett & Kinsbourne indicate that, "...temporal... details do not tell us directly about the contents of consciousness" (Time and the Observer, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm ). Just because a message is sent does not mean we instantly become aware of it subjectively.
On your comment: "-ok, I would need to re-read this part to check that it is indeed what Libet thinks and not Dennett’s interpretation of what Libet thinks."
--I think you are correct that it is Dennett's interpretation of what Libet thinks.
-Thank you very much for your comments, they were helpful. Thank you also for accepting me posting your message on this blog.
Christophe
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